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THE PROBABILITY OF ACTUAL BIAS, OBJECTIVE
STANDARDS, AND PANDORA'S Box-CAPERTON V. A. T.
MASSEY COAL COMPANY
Honorable Leon D. Lazer*
In the Appellate Division there is always a reserve judge wait-
ing to be called in to sit on a case if a judge on the sitting panel re-
cuses. It is not at all infrequent for judges to recuse and then the
waiting reserve judge who joins the panel hears the case. Neverthe-
less, in all the years I sat as a judge on the trial court, I may have re-
ceived two applications to recuse myself. One of those instances in-
volved a party who did not like the fact that I had been a town
attorney when he was active in the town-I think he believed that I
might be municipally-minded. I did not hesitate and recused myself.
However, in Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.' a state judge refused
to step down.2
Currently, thirty-nine states elect judges,3 and Caperton is a
case from West Virginia involving an elected judge.4 In Caperton,
Don Blankenship, the chairman of A.T. Massey Coal Company
("Massey"), contributed in total about $3,000,000 both directly and
* The Honorable Justice Leon D. Lazer is a graduate of the City College of New York, and
received an LL.B. from New York University School of Law. In his distinguished career, he
served as Associate Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department from 1979-1986, and was a Justice of the New York Supreme Court
from 1973-1986. Justice Lazer has authored over 128 judicial opinions. Prior to serving on
the bench, Justice Lazer was a partner at the law firm of Shea and Gould and Town Attorney
for the Town of Huntington, New York. He is Chair of the Pattern Jury Instructions Com-
mittee of the New York State Association of Supreme Court Justices. In addition, he is a
member of the American Law Institute, American Judicature Society, New York State, Suf-
folk County, and American Bar Associations, and Association of Supreme Court Justices of
New York State.
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2 Id. at 2256.
Id. at 2274.
4 Id. at 2257.
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indirectly to a judicial campaign.s The campaign succeeded and the
beneficiary of the contributions-Brent Benjamin-was elected.6
Subsequently, Judge Benjamin refused, on three occasions, to recuse
himself in a case involving Blankenship's company, and in fact,
voted to reverse a $50,000,000 judgment against the company.7 Ca-
perton became a well-known judicial recusal case, which went to the
Supreme Court and later became the subject of John Grisham's nov-
el, The Appeal.8
In 2002, a West Virginia jury returned a verdict of
$50,000,000 against Massey for fraudulent misrepresentation, con-
cealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual rela-
tions.9 Blankenship, the chairperson, CEO, and president of Massey
knew that the judgment would be appealed to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court, and decided to support an attorney named Brent Ben-
jamin in his election campaign against Justice McGraw-a West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court Justice who was running for reelection.' 0
Blankenship contributed $1000 directly to Benjamin's campaign and
$2.5 million to an independent political organization that opposed
Justice McGraw and supported Blankenship's campaign." Blanken-
ship also spent over $500,000 on independent mailings, letters, and
television and newspaper advertising to further Benjamin's cam-
paign.12 Blankenship's contributions exceeded the total amount of
money spent by all other Benjamin supporters and were three times
the amount of money spent by Benjamin's own campaign commit-
tee.13 In fact, "Blankenship spent [$1,000,000] more than the total
amount spent by" McGraw's campaign committee and Benjamin's
campaign committee combined.14
Benjamin won the election with fifty-three percent of the
Id
6 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
' Id. at 2258.
JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (Doubleday 2008) (depicting the actions of a chemical
company in the election of a state supreme court candidate against a sitting judge in
the hopes of influencing the appeal of an adverse judgment associated with its dump-
ing of toxic waste in a community's water supply).
9 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
10 Id.
11 Id. The $1000 contributed to Benjamin's campaign is the statutory maximum. Id.
12 id
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vote." "In October 2005, before Massey filed its petition for ap-
peal," the successful plaintiffs in the case against Massey-Caperton
and the three mining companies-moved to disqualify Justice Ben-
jamin from sitting on the appeal.16 However, in April 2006, Justice
Benjamin refused to disqualify himself asserting that there was no
objective information that he had prejudged the case or that he could
not be fair and impartial.' 7 In December 2006, Massey filed its ap-
peal challenging the adverse $50,000,000 jury verdict to the West
Virginia Supreme Court.18
In November 2007, the West Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed the $50,000,000 judgment on a three to two vote, with Justice
Benjamin voting for reversal and dissenting Justice Starcher declar-
ing that the " 'majority's opinion is morally and legally wrong.' ")19
The plaintiffs then moved for a rehearing and for disqualification of
the three justices who voted to reverse the judgment.20 Of the two
justices who recused, one did so after it had been exposed that he had
vacationed with Blankenship in the French Riviera. 2 1 The other jus-
tice had publicly criticized Blankenship's role in the election of Jus-
tice Benjamin and, as a result, took the initiative to disqualify him-
self, urging Justice Benjamin to do the same.22 Justice Benjamin did
not and, instead, inherited the role of chief justice in the case.23
On rehearing, after the recusers were replaced, Caperton, for
the third time, moved for recusal by Justice Benjamin again, who re-
fused.24 The court, in a three to two decision, once again ruled for
reversal, with Justice Benjamin declaring that he had no " 'direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in th[e] case." 25  The case
15 Id.
16 Id. at 2257.
17 Id. at 2257-58.
18 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
19 Id. at 2258 (citation omitted). The court reversed on two grounds: (1) a clause in the
contract and (2) res judicata barred the suit. Id.
20 id
21 id
22 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
23 Id ("Justice Benjamin, now in the capacity of acting chief justice, selected Judges
Cookman and Fox to replace the recused justices.").
24 id
25 Id. at 2258, 2259 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986)).
Four months after the reversal, Benjamin filed a concurring opinion in which he reiterated
that he had no interest in the case, and that his campaign was independent of any group or
2010] 667
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then advanced to the United States Supreme Court.26 While it was
pending, I thought, "How are the Justices going to split? This deci-
sion is not going to be a traditional liberal/conservative split." How-
ever, to my surprise, the Court's decision was the traditional split
with Justice Kennedy joining the so-called liberals and writing the
opinion reversing the West Virginia Supreme Court.27
At the outset of his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated the prop-
osition clearly: "Under our precedents there are objective standards
that require recusal when 'the probability of actual bias on the part of
the judge . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.' "528 In ap-
plying those precedents, Justice Kennedy concluded that "in all the
circumstances of this case, due process requires recusal." 29 However,
the precedents he relied on are small in number and largely consist of
dicta in pecuniary interest cases where a recusal was required. 30 He
relied heavily on Tumey v. Ohio, a case decided in 1947, in which a
village mayor had authority to sit as a judge to try those accused of
violating the state liquor laws relative to their alleged possession of
alcoholic beverages. 31 The funds that paid the mayor's salary for this
individual. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 300 (W. Va. 2008).
26 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
27 See Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at
Al (noting that the Supreme Court is currently made up of four liberal justices and four con-
servative justices, while Kennedy serves as a powerful swing vote and that Caperton was the
only major case in the last quarter that Kennedy joined the liberal wing).
28 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
29 Id. at 2257.
30 See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 (1986) (holding that a justice was required to recuse in a
case where he was a lead plaintiff in a nearly identical lawsuit); Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47
(stating that recusal is required when "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable"); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 578 (1973) (holding that an administrative board of optometrists were required to re-
cuse themselves from a case involving competing optometrists because of a significant pe-
cuniary interest); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (holding that a
mayor was required to recuse because of the "possible temptation" he faced in deciding a
case where he shared a direct interest in the fees granted); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (holding that "a defendant in [a] criminal contempt proceeding[]
should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor");
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[N]o man can be a judge in his own case and
no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (determining that the mayor of a village, sitting as a judge, was
required to recuse because he had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case he
was hearing).
3 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 515; see Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 ("The early and leading case
on the subject is Tumey v. Ohio .... ).
4
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service were derived solely from the fines imposed-no conviction,
no salary.32 The Tumey Court held that the mayor had a direct finan-
cial interest in the outcome and, therefore, due process required dis-
qualification.33
Although the Tumey Court declared that kinship, personal bi-
as, state policy, and remoteness of interest were generally seen in
matters of legislative discretion,34 Justice Kennedy concluded that
the Court was concerned with more than direct pecuniary interest
when it declared that
[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temp-
tation to the average man as a judge to forget the bur-
den of proof required to convict [a] defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the state and the accused de-
nies the latter due process of law.
Among the other cases cited by Justice Kennedy 36 was anoth-
er one involving a mayor with a financial interest sitting as a judge.37
That Court held that the proper constitutional requirement was
whether sitting on the case would "'offer a possible temptation to the
. . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true' 38  Also cited was Aetna v. Lavoie, where a financial interest
was indicated when the judge who cast the deciding vote on a puni-
tive damages award against an insurance company had been a lead
plaintiff in a similar lawsuit. 39 Another type of case requiring recusal
was exemplified by a "judge presiding at [a] contempt hearing [who]
also served as the 'one-man grand jury' out of which the contempt
32 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 520; Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 ("The mayor-judge thus received
a salary supplement only if he convicted the defendant.").
33 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. The Court held disqualification was required under the Due
Process Clause "because of [the mayor-judge's] direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and
because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs
of the village." Id. at 535.
34 Id. at 523.
" Id. at 532.
36 See Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813; Withrow, 421 U.S. 35; Gibson, 411 U.S. 564; Ward, 409
U.S. 57.
" Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
38 Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
Id. (citing Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 823-24).
2010] 669
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charges arose."40
Based on those precedents,41 Justice Kennedy posited that the
inquiry was not whether Benjamin was actually biased, but rather if
the average judge when conducting a trial was likely to be neutral or
whether there was an unconstitutional potential for bias. 42 "[U]nder a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,"
whether the interest of the judge "'poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented."' 43 Thus,
there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objec-
tive and reasonable perceptions-when a person with
a personal stake in a particular case had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on
the case by raising funds or directing the judge's elec-
tion campaign when the case was pending or immi-
nent.44
Under this standard, "[t]he inquiry centers on the contribution's rela-
tive size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to
the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent
effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election."45 Fur-
ther, "[d]ue process requires an objective inquiry into whether the
contributor's influence on the election under all the circumstances
'would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to ...
40 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 134. See also Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261 ("The second in-
stance requiring recusal that was not discussed at common law emerged in the criminal con-
tempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but was challenged be-
cause of a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.").
41 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262 ("Based on the principles described in these cases we turn
to the issue before us. This problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a framework
not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed."). Kennedy further classi-
fied the recusal cases cited as illustrative and stated that "[i]n each case the Court dealt with
extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probability of bias that 'cannot be defined with
precision.' " Id. at 2265 (citing Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136)).
42 Id. at 2263 ("We do not question his subjective findings of impartiality and propriety.
Nor do we determine whether there was actual bias.").
43 Id. (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
4 Id. at 2263-64. It seems to have been glossed over in the media coverage that the Court
is now encompassing those involved in campaign management and the campaigning process
as relevant to the determination of whether a judge is required to recuse.
45 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
[Vol. 26670
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lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."' 4 6 Justice Ken-
nedy concluded that "the risk that Blankenship's influence engen-
dered actual bias"-an influence of $3,000,000, which exceeds the
amount spent by Benjamin's other supporters by 300% and is
$1,000,000 more than the amount spent by both campaigns' commit-
tees combined-was "sufficiently substantial that it 'must be forbid-
den if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately imple-
mented."' 47
In response to the argument that the Court's decision would
open up a Pandora's Box-floods of recusals and unnecessary inter-
ferences with judicial elections-, Justice Kennedy noted that in the
instant case, the facts were extreme and, although these types of cases
are rare, extreme cases often test the balance of due process and are
likely to cross those balances.48
He also found support in the judicial canons of ethics and
state codes. 49  For example, the American Bar Association Model
Code of Judicial Conduct-adopted in most states-tests whether the
conduct would create, in reasonable minds, a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibility with integrity, par-
tiality, and competence is impaired.5 0  "The Due Process Clause
[]marks 'only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualiflying]' " pro-
cedures.5 ' Most disputes will be resolved "without resort to the Con-
stitution."52 Incidentally, in 2003, a commission appointed by Judge
46 Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
47 Id. at 2264 (quoting Withdrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
48 Id. at 2265 ("Massey and its amici predict that various adverse consequences will fol-
low from recognizing a constitutional violation here-ranging from a flood of recusal motions
to unnecessary interference with judicial elections."); see, e.g., County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying due process to the is-
sue of "executive abuse of power ... which shocks the conscience") .
49 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266.
so See W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CON. ANN., CANON 2A (West 2009) ("A judge shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety .... ). The New York canons of judicial
ethics state that a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See generally N.Y. CODE OF JUD.
CON., CANON 2 (McKinney 2009).
s Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 ("Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose
more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here to-
day." (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828)).
52 See id. ("Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due
process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the
Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus be
confined to rare instances.").
2010] 671
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Kaye recommended a $500 contribution as the amount that would
disqualify a judge.
The dissent in Caperton was vigorous. Chief Justice Roberts
expressed his "fear that the Court's decision will undermine" the very
values that the majority seeks to promote. 54
[N]otions of bias or the appearance of bias were never
a basis for disqualification, either at common law or
under our constitutional precedents.
. . . "[P]robability of bias" cannot be defined in any
limited way. The Court's new "rule" provides no
guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal
will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably
lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased
55
The principle thrust of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion lies in
forty questions that he posed.56 For example:
1. How much money is too much money? What level
of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a "proba-
bility of bias"?
8. What if the "disproportionately" large expenditure
is made by an industry association, trade union, physi-
cians' group, or the plaintiffs' bar? Must the judge re-
cuse in all cases that affect the association's interests?
Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party or
lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how
much the litigant contributed to the association?
9. What if the case involves a social or ideological is-
sue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse
from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has re-
5 See Daniel Wise, Commission Recommends Reforms for Judicial Elections, 230 N.Y.
L.J. 1 (2003) ("Among the measures put forward by the commission is a requirement that
judges recuse themselves when parties or lawyers appearing before them have contributed
more than $500 to their campaigns over the five previous years.").
54 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5 Id.
56 See id. at 2269-72.
672 [Vol. 26
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ceived "disproportionate" support from individuals
who feel strongly about either side of that issue? If
the supporter wants to help elect judges who are
"tough on crime," must the judge recuse in all criminal
cases?
10. What if the candidate draws "disproportionate"
support from a particular racial, religious, ethnic, or
other group, and the case involves an issue of particu-
lar importance to that group?
18. Should we assume that elected judges feel a "debt
of hostility" towards major opponents of their candi-
dacies? Must the judge recuse in cases involving in-
dividuals or groups who spent large amounts of money
trying unsuccessfully to defeat him?5 7
Chief Justice Roberts also disputed the facts underlying the
majority opinion, noting that Justice Benjamin did not have control
over how Blankenship spent his money58 and that the contributions
were not disproportionate; in fact, the plaintiffs' bar contributed
$2,000,000 to support Justice McGraw.59 In the Chief Justice's opi-
nion, Justice McGraw simply did not run a very good campaign and
at one point made a controversial and disturbing speech. 60 Finally,
"an amorphous 'probability of bias[]' will itself bring our judicial
system into underserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts." 61 He
1 Id. at 2269.
5 Id. at 2273 ("Other than a $1,000 direct contribution from Blankenship, Justice Benja-
min and his campaign had no control over how this money was spent. Campaigns go to
great lengths to develop precise messages and strategies.")
5 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273.
60 Id. at 2273-74.
61 Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). It was noted in the opinion that
[m]any observers believed that Justice Benjamin's opponent doomed his
candidacy by giving a well-publicized speech that made several curious
allegations; this speech was described in the local media as "deeply dis-
turbing" and worse. Justice Benjamin's opponent also refused to give
interviews or participate in debates. All but one of the major West Vir-
ginia newspapers endorsed Justice Benjamin. Justice Benjamin just
might have won because the voters of West Virginia thought he would
2010] 673
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concluded: "I hope I am wrong."62
Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Roberts in a separate brief
dissent. 63 "The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all
wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution." 64
The case has been reargued in West Virginia, and we await
the opinion.65
be a better judge than his opponent.
Id. (citation omitted).
62 id
63 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 2275.
65 This opinion was later published in November 2009. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co.,
No. 33350, 2009 WL 3806071 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009) (reversing the decision and remand-
ing for dismissal with prejudice).
674 [Vol. 26
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